The RCE sought feedback on the Draft QHIN Technical Framework released July 28, 2021. In addition to engaging the RCE through the public, virtual events, you may have chosen to submit written feedback.
All feedback submitted to the RCE is publicly available below.
View Submission File (PDF)
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View Submission File (PDF)
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Directory services must be public information. It should not be required to agree to anything to get this information. This is critical for epidemiological research and for healthcare outcomes research. The FHIR directory services, should resolve to both FHIR and Direct Address endpoints and your document should require Direct Address endpoints explicitly.
Both FHIR and Direct were designed to work as open Internet protocols. Without seeing the directory information publicly it is not possible for newcomers to the network to understand what the benefit of the network is. Nor is it possible for watch-dog data journalists (like myself) to use the public access to find fundamental flaws in the directory services, including the fact that many providers are still reluctant to publish these results. In order for “name and shame” to work to ensure that the network is healthy, we must be able to see clearly into Directory Services.
NPPES will be hosting FHIR and Direct endpoints, and this *will* become the authoritative directory for this information. If the directory services are publicly available, then it will be possible to ensure that addresses stay in sync. Without this, there will be an irreconcilable out-of-sync that will be ongoing.
Please do not dismiss this suggestion as “insecure” The Direct protocol and FHIR protocols are MORE secure to share publicly than physical addresses, fax numbers and phone numbers. If we ever want to see Fax replaced for health information exchange then it must be as easy to find a doctors digital endpoint as it is to find their fax number. The people who are arguing for privacy and our cybersecurity concerns here are mis-informed about the design of the underlying protocols.
Please get this right. This is what makes the health information exchange network ultimately accessible for patients in the end. To do otherwise is to create a secrecy “tax” that will only apply to patient provider communications in the end.
You should not need to be a participant or subparticipant to get access to certain information: i.e. directory services.
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I note the statement on Page 24 of the overview presentation
OAuth not designed for multi-hop.
• Originating user unknown to responder.
I wish to draw your attention to RFC 8693 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8693) that provides a standard for recording multi-hop security transactions with either delegation or impersonation semantics. This standard is not fully supported by all vendors, but support is improving.
The following, from the RFC, shows the mechanism for indicating that the token has been “exchanged” and the previous subject is recorded.
{
“aud”:”https://service26.example.com”,
“iss”:”https://issuer.example.com”,
“exp”:1443904100,
“nbf”:1443904000,
“sub”:”user@example.com”,
“act”:
{
“sub”:”https://service16.example.com”,
“act”:
{
“sub”:”https://service77.example.com”
}
}
}
View Submission File (PDF)
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View Submission File (PDF)
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I am specifically providing feedback on the question of including message delivery in the QTF. It should NOT at this time. Wait for the FHIR based solution to arrive. REASON: adopting, then migrating from one technology to another is a troublesome and costly approach. Better to implement ONCE on the FHIR environment. The Amish have a saying: “Three moves is as good as a fire!”. Do not be ignorant of this wisdom.
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View Submission File (PDF)
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View Submission File (PDF)
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View Submission File (PDF)
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IHE’s family of Document Sharing health information exchange integration profiles act as the foundation of health information exchange activities enabled by current national networks utilized in the United States, such as Carequality, CommonWell, DirectTrust, and eHealth Exchange. The Document Sharing HIE integration profile family addresses the problem of exchanging clinical documents (for example, discharge summaries, lab reports, pathology reports, etc.) between information systems in different enterprises. See the appendix at the end of this comment for more information on IHE’s Document Sharing HIE integration profile family.
IHE USA agrees with the use of this widely implemented family of document sharing integration profiles to support the current and future vision for the nation’s health data interoperability represented within the Trusted Exchange Framework and Common Agreement (TEFCA). We believe that a use case-based approach to the integration of FHIR into QHIN-to-QHIN data exchange will allow the industry to utilize an outcomes-based vs. timeline-driven change management paradigm. A use case-driven approach will also allow stakeholders across the industry to better co-collaborate on use cases that meet current and emerging health data priorities and will facilitate a smoother transition to support FHIR Document-based exchange in production environments by appropriately extending the capabilities of existing technology architectures. We encourage the establishment of use case-driven pilot studies at provider organizations such as those who have received the HIMSS Davies Award of Excellence or EMRAM Stage 7 recognition to help establish FHIR Document-based exchange best practices that the broader industry can look to as best practices in order to support their own transition from CDA to a FHIR-based data exchange architecture.
Additionally, IHE’s Cross-Community Document Sharing integration profiles recommended for QHIN-to-QHIN data exchange can help the nation manage the transition to RESTful data exchange as these profiles are content agnostic. While currently leveraging HL7’s clinical document architecture (CDA) exchange standard, these profiles can also leverage HL7’s FHIR as discussed in the example below. Additionally, the existing nationwide networks have leveraged CDA-based IHE profiles to resolve many current exchange issues, such as those around privacy, security, discovery, routing, vocabulary alignment, quality, and patient Identity. While FAST workgroups are making good progress to address with http RESTful exchange, work remains to be done to achieve the same functionality currently enabled through CDA-based IHE profiles.
Should QTF include QHIN Message Delivery?
Option 1: Require “QHIN Message Delivery” modality in QTF using the Integrating the Health Care Enterprise (IHE) Cross-Community Document Reliable Interchange (XCDR) profile with a future transition to FHIR is the path I recommend. Given that the Q/R QHIN exchanges are utilizing IHE published profiles due to there broad deployment in the industry, the fundamental underpinnings for XCDR are already required for QHINs. Active work to identify and address technical issues with using a FHIR-based exchange for message delivery (and Q/R) should however be continued and expedited.
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MaxMD is an Interoperability Service Provider that leverages IHE, HL7, FHIR and Direct Secure Messaging standards to create solutions that provide clinical data liquidity and healthcare interoperability for thousands of Healthcare and Healthcare related clients. We are responding to the request for comments to the current draft of QHIN Technical Framework and more specifically to the question; “Should the QTF include QHIN Message Delivery? If you believe QHIN Message Delivery should be included, how should it be technically specified?”
Before responding I would comment that while I can understand the need to focus the responses as a process management technique, I think the options provided miss an obvious and pragmatic choice. The DirectTrust Network is an established Trust Network infrastructure that already exists and provides a secure push modality that is easily integrates with virtually any edge system or application. Today, Direct Secure Messaging is an used by over 260,000 organizations exchanging over 100 million transactions monthly and over 2 Billion transactions to date. Perhaps most importantly, the DirectTrust Network is not a separate network; the very organizations considering use of xCDR as a push modality likely are already using Direct Secure Messaging.
XCDR would be a duplicative effort that would increase cost for no apparent benefit or increase in capability. The Direct Protocol is versatile and still evolving with improvements such as Message Context IG, Distributing ADTs and already has an improving National Directory of end points that will serve to increase the usability and value of the existing network. Direct Secure Messaging and the FHIR Community are already working together to leverage the best of both modalities. Adding another push option like XCDR would likely confuse the market, add burden, limit growth, and likely create no additional functionality.
Given the choice of the three suggested responses we would recommend that Sequoia “ Defer “QHIN Message delivery from the QTF until a FHIR Base Solution is readily available”. However, the smarter path would be to continue to develop on the foundation of Direct Secure Messaging that has been firmly established over the past 10 years. We appreciate that Sequoia may view XCDR as a familiar push modality for many current active members, but given the diverse capabilities of the overall healthcare market creating an additional “push modality” with no apparent advantage over Direct Secure Messaging seems counterproductive.
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According to an ONC data brief from February of 2019: “HISPs that enables messaging via DIRECT protocol were the most common electronic method used by hospitals for sending and receiving summary of care records in 2019.”
Your question “Should the QTF include QHIN Message Delivery? If you believe QHIN Message Delivery should be included, how should it be technically specified?” the recommendation based upon the market place right now and support by the ONC data brief is Direct Secure Messaging as a good starting place for push messaging in TEFCA, since Direct is broadly deployed. A selection from the options outlined by the RCE does not provide one that addresses market place concerns. If absolutely required to select from required options it would be:
Option 2 – “Defer “QHIN Message Delivery” from QTF until a FHIR based solution is readily available”.
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I believe that it is important that the TEFCA framework include message delivery from the outset. Interoperability is a dynamic process that must support multiple use cases and methods of information flow. Two fundamental needs that clinicians have are the ability to push and to query for clinical data to support patient transitions and care coordination. If the TEFCA is to fulfil its promise of a single onramp to nationwide interoperability, support for unsolicited push messaging must be included. There are a number of technical methods that could be used to support this capability. Our industry currently successfully utilizes both Direct and XCDR messaging in support of push messaging and will eventually support FHIR-based messaging. I believe that the QTF should begin with a requirement to support push via either of the currently available technical standards with a plan to include FHIR when feasible. In the future, it would be ideal to standardize on a single technical solution for push, but requiring such standardization before the industry is ready to support it risks the success of the TEFCA.
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